same line of 'circumstantial evidence', with a series of equally straightforward considerations.
(i) On a par with the League of Nations, the UN is not a 'super-state'. This was stated by the International Court of Justice in. 1949 and was confirmed by the same body on another occasion; 5 furthermore, the head of the US delegation to the San Francisco Conference had already assured the President of the United States to the same effect 6 (ii) The degree of centralization of the UN is so far removed from that of a federal state that it does not even approach that of a confederation. Pursuing the comparison with the North American Union, the UN does not even achieve the degree of integration of the Articles of Confederation: an instrument to which the name of constitution was most likely given only after it had been surpassed by events and when the elites of the thirteen colonies had espoused the idea that the Articles should be completely superseded by a true constitution.
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(iii) The Charter disqualifies itself as a constitution in that it expressly reserves, together with equality, the sovereignty of all member States (Article 2.1) and their domestic jurisdiction (Article 2.7). This point was firmly stressed by Dulles at San Francisco, when he observed (in defence of his preferred formulation of Article 2.7) that the UN was to deal only with governments. 'advanced' confederation, as may be seen in the Articles of Confederation, goes beyond governments.
(iv) The only point which would seem to lessen the gap between the Charter and a confederal pact (although remaining very far from a federal constitution) is the provision -rara avis -for the direct availability of armed forces on the part of the Organization. One might be tempted to equate this with what was achieved by the North American Union during the war of independence, even prior to the entry into force of the Articles of Confederation; namely, the possibility of direct recourse to armed force by the Congress, under the command of George Washington who was directly appointed by that body. Apart from the fact, however, that only under certain highly problematic conditions would the Charter provisions in question be sufficient to qualify the UN as a constitutional fabric under international law, it is well known that the implementation of those provisions remains highly improbable.
m. The Theoretical Test of the Analogy
Moving away from merely circumstantial evidence, the real test as to whether the federal analogy thesis holds with respect to the UN is the degree, if any, to which the Charter affects the legal structure of the relations of the member States with each other. The problem is whether the rules laid down in the Charter and the organs operating in implementation thereof modify to any degree the kind of egalitarian, essentially horizontal relations existing among states under general international law and ordinary treaty rules. It is, in other words, a question of determining whetherand possibly to what extent -the Charter brings about any 'vertjcalization' in the relations of the member States inter se and with the UN that may justify the federal analogies assumed by the constitutional theories. This is the point that requires verification. And to do so it is indispensable to carry the analysis beyond the generic data considered so far.
Such an analysis must be conducted within the broader framework of that general international law with respect to which (according to the constitutional theories) the Charter would have brought about structural innovations of an institutional nature. It is therefore necessary to consider, first of all, at least some of the most crucial aspects of the concept of general international law wherein the constitutional theories of the Charter are presumably rooted.
Constitutional conceptions of the UN, as this author rightly or wrongly understands them, are based upon those theories which envisage the whole of international law as a kind of decentralized public law of the legal community of mankind. In particular, three interrelated corollaries of such theories stand out as a premise of the constitutional conception of the UN.
This issue is discussed further in Section IV.
The first corollary is that, as a legal community, the universal human society is not, per se, inorganic. On the contrary, it is, in its own way, organized. In legal terms, it is organized into separate, autonomous political communities governed by their respective states. Within the framework of this conception, each state appears to be a juridical subdivision of the universal legal community, legitimized as such to rule over its respective national society. The situation of states under international law would thus be qualitatively not dissimilar to the situation of municipalities, provinces, regions, dipartements, cantons and L&nder -or the member states of a federation -legitimized by national law as autonomous institutions for the governance of the respective state subdivisions. In other words, states are viewed, implicitly or explicitly, as organs of international law, the latter being understood, as noted, as the public law of the legal community of mankind. Compared with the major forms of association -the unitary state, the federal state, the confederationthe international legal community would be characterized, according to this vision, by a higher degree of decentralization of the governmental functions attributed by international law to states. One of the most egregious examples of this construction is Georges Scelle's theory of didoublement fonctionnel: a didoublement by virtue of which each state would operate simultaneously as internal legislator and international legislator -but in either role it would be acting in the legal capacity of a decentralized organ of an international law conceived as the constitutional law of mankind. In conclusion, the 'constitutionalists' assume that legal organization would already exist not only within national societies under national law, but also in the universal human society as governed by international law. Hence, according to this view, some degree of organization, however rudimentary, would pre-date the League and the UN.
The second corollary is that every agreement between states constitutes an interinstitutional act, deriving that character from the public law nature of the contracting states in their capacity as decentralized organs (first corollary) of the universal legal community. It follows that agreements between states would be suitable law-making instruments by means of which states could establish further organs, transferring to them a part of their functions in such a way as to reduce the degree of decentralization of the universal public law. The Charter would supposedly have had just such an effect
The third corollary is that international law is essentially inter-individual. Consequently, not only states, but also peoples themselves, would form the 'constituency' of international law.
10 Building on the public law nature of the agreements establishing international organs, this last point completes the picture by automatically involving the peoples, and the individuals composing them, in the compacts concluded by states, as their trustees, to institute new organs in addition to existing (state) ones. As the public law of mankind, international law would thus be endowed, on a par with the law of any integrated society, with the following three features: (a) an original organic context; that is to say, a legal organization into states, and therefore a first basic step in organization; (b) a suitable constitutional instrument -the treaty -to reduce the degree of decentralization; and (c) an inter-individual constituency, forming both the addressees of the actions of the international organs as well as the human resources to staff the mechanisms of those organs. There would thus exist in international society, albeit in a rudimentary fashion, the essential legal and sociological conditions which enable national societies to modify any part of the central or peripheral organization of the state and its subdivisions.
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Hence, naturally, the constitutional nature of the UN Charter -and, in particular, two further, more specific assumptions: (i) that the UN membership is bound by the Charter into a community embracing the member States and their peoples in a qualitatively similar sense to the way in which a legal person or any subdivision of national law embraces its members; (ii) that such a community is so personified as to be placed by international law over and above states in the same sense as legal persons of national law are placed 'over and above' their members or subjects. I place these two interrelated corollaries under the single heading of the 'personified corporate body analogy'.
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As I have discussed the constitutional theory of international law and its corollaries elsewhere, 13 I need not develop the whole argument here. I shall thus limit myself to stating that the above-mentioned corollaries collapse at the same time as the unproved notion that international law is the public law of mankind. Against such a notion stand, together with an impressive body of scholarly opinion, countless facts which demonstrate that international law is a body of sui generis rules governing relations between states as factual, independent entities. In the international community one fails to find the 'original' organization, so to speak, which the constitutionalists imaginatively seem to perceive in a coexistence of states as presumed organs of international law. Nor do the further corollaries come to light: neither the 'natural' capability of inter-state compacts to modify the decentralized structure of the supposed legal community of mankind by placing international bodies above states (or states above states), nor the inter-individual nature of international law, thanks to which the peoples would be 'naturally' available to staff international organs and to be the direct addressees of the organs' action. For the present purposes, I only believe it necessary to stress, in addition to the above-mentioned factual nature of states as international persons, one essential point. Unlike the private law of national communities, which is conditioned and guaranteed by a public law, international law (referring to general international law 14 Neither the delegation of powers to the agents of the autonomous entity nor the direct subjection of the agents to the law of the whole (national) community. Any student of public law is familiar with this notion. Whatever the term used, it is something quite different from the independence of the average sovereign state. Within such a rudimentary framework, it is extremely difficult to imagine that a mere inter-state compact like the Charter, drawn up without the least participation of peoples, could exert the constitutional force indispensable to bring about either the supra-ordination of UN organs to the member States and their peoples, or any similarly significant change in the composition and structure of the system.
IV. A More Direct Test: 'RelationneV and 'InstitutionneV in the UN
A useful technical tool which may assist in approximating an answer to the question is the distinction between relatiomel and institutionnel: terms which give a better idea of the distinction in French than in Ttfll' nn or English Clearly, die institutionnel is not lacking. It is obviously present within the structure through which the UN functions; that is, the UN apparatus, including on the one hand the Organization's staff and, on the other, the groups of individuals participating in the various organs as state delegates or in a personal capacity. Taken together, the members of the Secretariat and those of collective bodies make up an inter-individual milieu within which hierarchical organization is no less present than it is within a national parliament or a diplomatic conference. The presence of public law is manifest in the Staff Regulations, the Staff Rules and other norms created within the apparatus by enactment or custom. It seems evident, however, that any relationships of supra-and sub-ordination in the apparatus involve only individual members, not the states that some of them represent. The same public law nature clearly characterizes the equally inter-individual rules governing those components of the UN's apparatus which operate in the field, when the Organization carries out operational activities in the territory of one or more -consenting -states. 19 The situation is quite different, however, with regard to member States' relations with the Organization; and this should be readily perceived, despite the ambiguities created by explicit or implied assumptions of the constitutional theories.
Analysis of the relations between the UN and the member States does not demonstrate that the former is really vested with powers vis-d-vis the latter. To be sure, the situation of addressees of deliberations issued by UN organs -particularly binding decisions -is generally described in terms of subjection of states to the UN. But this is a matter of linguistic convenience. It does not appear to reflect a real alteration of the essentially inter-state nature of the relations governed by the Charter as part of international law.
For instance, the decisions by which the General Assembly determines the contributions due from member States to cover the Organization's expenses obligate each state vis-d-vis the other states.
It is true that Article 19 of the Charter provides that if a member defaults on payment for two years, it 'shall have no vote' in the Assembly. However, leaving aside the fact that this automatic sanction has not been applied even to seriously defaulting states, and leaving aside the fact that implementation of this sanction would necessitate one or more states taking the initiative and the majority of the Assembly voting in favour, even the most ardent constitutionalist should not fail to wonder how the UN could act in the event that the debt remained unpaid despite the sanction.
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What could the UN do? Put forward a request for payment, surely, but what else? Absent any right to institute proceedings before the IGJ, I find it difficult to envisage the UN obtaining submission of the issue to an arbitral tribunal. Still less can I see the UN resorting to countermeasures -namely, reprisals -against the evader. Only the other member States would be entitled, according to general international law, to adopt countermeasures. Thus, the creditors in the true sense -those able to exact paymentwould seem to be the member States rather than the UN.
This state of affairs does not prove, it would seem, that the UN is legally supraordinated to the member States. If anything, it demonstrates rather that the UN is subordinate to the member States. This point will be developed in Section V below.
The situation seems not to be significantly different as regards the obligation of states to comply with Security Council decisions relating to non-military measures, under Article 41 of the Charter. Again, any reaction to non-compliance remains in the hands of states, as does the implementation of measures decided upon. -Military force remains in the hands of states, particularly in the hands of some states. Thus, the system does not go far beyond the vesting of some states with rights, faculties or obligations, which appear to be quite similar, in good legal substance, to those embodied or implied in an unequal alliance treaty. The only institutional element §eems to be the Security Council's casus foederis determination. But even that element is quite conceivable, mutatis mutandis, within the framework of an unequal alliance: the casus foederis determination could well be effected by a more or less representative Gaetano Arangio-RuLz ad hoc or permanent collective body, whose decision should not necessarily be exempt from some control on the part of the less equal allies.
One is thus bound to conclude that even in the area in which, according to the constitutional theories, the Charter has been most innovative, we remain, despite the Charter (the only exception being the presence of an apparatus), in die sphere of relatiormel: unless, of course, one attributed to the UN the questionably institutionnel element represented by the political and military weight of some states, a confusion which seems not infrequently to occur in die literature. 21 The point of UN 'supremacy', regarding the Council's decisions as well as die Assembly's, will be taken up again below.
V. The 'Special' Community Concept and the 'Personified Corporate Body' Model
The argument tentatively developed in the preceding paragraphs would seem to be questioned, however, by die two further assumptions of die constitutional theory outlined above in Section IE. I refer to die various formulations of the 'organized community' concept and what I call the 'personified corporate body model'.
(i) According to die most common formulation of die first assumption, me entry into force of the UN Charter and its implementation created a 'special' community composed of the UN members, such community being characterized by a relatively higher degree of centralization. 22 According to me second tenet, diis special community was endowed, tiirough a choice of die founders implied in die Charter, widi a corporate personality placing the UN 'over and above' die member States, if not over any states 23 -although it is not quite clear whetiier die proponents of this argument are referring to a constituency of states, of individuals, or berth. In my opinion, however, it does not appear that these assumptions can be of any help to the constitutional theories.
The concept of community is abused by adherents to me constitutional tiieories, even in areas other than international political organization. Some scholars actually go so far as to assert diat any treaty -bilateral or multilateral -establishes a community among the contracting states. Some speak of die Universal Postal Union as establishing a 'universal postal community' operating over a universal 'postal territory'. And some audiors envisage die Statute of the Id as establishing a 'judicial community'. A par-
21
See Section VI below. 22
Ago, "Comuniti intemazionale universal^ e comunitl intemazkxiali particolari', 5 La Comuniti intemazionale (1930). I leave out in principle, for present purposes, that variation of this 'particular' or 'special (UN) community' notion, namdy, the further idea that the Charter would have been from the outset, or would at some time have become, the constitution of the universal community of states or peoples as it would result from, or manifest itself in, general international law.
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That would seem to be die case for those who envisage die Charter as the constitution of the universal international community, as mentioned in note 22 supra.
The 'Federal Analogy' and UN Charter Interpretation: A Crucial Issue ticularly broad use of the special community concept was proposed -surprisingly -by Roberto Ago.
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Confining our discourse to the UN, the presence of a community seems both superfluous and implausible. The futility of the notion of a community underlying the Charter, or created thereby, is plainly evident if we consider such elementary legal situations as those characterizing the various types of inter-state arbitration and judicial settlement by the ICJ. Whether an inter-state arbitral award emanates from an ad hoc tribunal composed of private parties, as is mostly the case, or from a third state, its binding character rests neither upon the authority of an arbitral or judicial community established between the litigating states by me compromis, nor upon an authority exercised over the parties by the tribunal or by the arbitrating state per sear as an organ of any such community. Rather, it follows simply from the obligation undertaken by the parties toward each other to abide by the decision: a contract, or at most a customary rule. The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, about judgments of the ICJ.
If such is the case, one fails to see in what sense the situation is any different where, ceteris paribus, in the place of an arbitral tribunal, a third state or the ICJ, one finds a number of organs set up or referred to in a single constituent treaty such as the Charter. My belief is that it is not The question whether such a treaty creates a community (possibly with authority) concerns the relationship among the member States inter se, and between the international organ and the member States. It is not a question of relationship between the organs. Whether an organization is mono-organic or pluriorganic may mean much for the variety of its tasks or its efficiency; it does not make any difference, however, to the question under discussion. Equally not decisive are both the multilateral character of the constituent instrument and the permanent nature of the organs. Although the Statute of the ICJ is a multilateral treaty establishing a permanent organ, nobody really believes that that statute creates a 'judicial community' in any proper sense of the term. Thus, just as there is no need or evidence of a community -of given states, or of a part or the whole of mankind -underlying an arbitral award or a Court judgment for it to perform its dispute-settling function, there is no need or evidence of such a community behind an Assembly deliberation under Article 17.2 of the Charter or a Security Council deliberation under Article 39, 41 or 42, for either deliberation to produce its contractual effects. This applies a fortiori to recommendations.
Turning to the implausibility of the creation of a community, the essential point is mat the constituent treaty is not the appropriate legal instrument to produce such a prodigy. Within the framework of a law of nations, understood as the law of relations among political units constituted in fact and coexisting as equals in the universal society of men but outside a supposed inter-individual legal order 'of the whole' expressed by that society, any organization set up by inter-state compact bears within itselfwhatever its merits or shortcomings -an original flaw, inherent in the nature of the Be that as it may, the intentions of the contracting sovereigns were made clear, in 1945, by the reservations I referred to in Section II above. They demonstrate that states did not intend to assume, once the compact was in force, that status which is typical of the member states of a federation -namely, the status of subdivisions or partial communities within a larger one. An egregious example is the status that the thirteen founding members of the American Union had attained, in a measure, even as early as at the time of the Articles of Confederation. 26 On the contrary, the founders of the UN intended to remain, and remained, what they were prior to the treaty. (ii) More delicate is that further aspect of the corporate body model concerning the legal personality of the UN, whether as a community of the member States (or their peoples) or just as the UN. The personified corporate body model is misleading as it all depends entirely on the kind of personality one speaks of. International personality is not infrequently mentioned or implied as one of the signs that the Organization is endowed, inter alia, with authoritative functions.
28 But this is questionable.
The personality of the UN derives from the same rules or principles which determine the legal personality of any other international person, be it a state, an insurgent party, a government in exile or the Holy See. Indeed, there can hardly be any question that the UN in fact exists as an entity materially able -in certain matters -to act and manifest a will in such conditions of independence as to participate, per se, in international legal relations. Matters in which the United Nations reveals such a capacity obviously include the ability to contract with regard to headquarters and other objects, privileges and immunities, the rights and duties connected with diplomatic relations, the rights and duties connected with the treatment of members of UN staff, and so forth. Capacity to contract will obviously be instrumental, in its turn, to the acquisition by agreement of further rights and duties. The legal personality of the UN must be qualified, however, with respect to both its source and its nature.
As regards the former, we have stressed long ago that the international personality of the UN is not a legal effect of the constituent instrument Naturally, such an instrument has a role, in mat it was by carrying out the provisions of the Charter that the organs were actually set up. This role, however, is not direct in the same sense that the legal personality of a legal person originates with an acte defondation or association under a national law, by operation of general or aJ/toe authoritative enactments; nor is it direct in the same sense that a piece of legislation is the source of the personality of a province or other subdivision of national law. The Charter was the legal basis upon which the Organization could be materially constituted. As noted, personality derived, for the entity actually established, from general international law. We disagree, in this respect, with the relevant part of the Court's 1949 opinion.
Even more importantly, the international personality of the UN must also be qualified with regard to its nature. Indeed, to say that the UN is a person does not imply that 
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It follows, in my view, that also with respect to personality, as well as with respect to community, the position of the UN does not differ from that of an arbitral tribunal or an arbitrating state. If there is otherwise no personality, as is most probably the case with the arbitral tribunal, the lack of such quality has no negative impact on the binding character of the award, as it derives from the agreement between the litigating states. Conversely, the presence of international personality, in the case of an arbitrating state, does not alter the situation in a contrary, positive sense. That state has no more claim to the parties' compliance than a tribunal has.
Similarly, the possession of international personality, while useful for other purposes, does not significantly affect, vis-a-vis the member States, the position of the UN. Of course, international personality allows the Organization to participate in legal relationships essential to its existence and operation. In turn, this will affect the Organization's functioning indirectly. However, in so far as the functioning per se is concerned, the Organization does not operate as a person in legal authority -or, to use Fitzmaurice's words once again in a different connection, 'over and above' statesmore than does the arbitral tribunal or an arbitrating third state.
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The international personality of the UN is thus not functional in the same sense as the personality of municipal corporations. Behind the obligations incumbent upon each member of the UN we do not find the Organization as the agent of the allegedly organized international community. There is the authority of international law, and, underlying that, the rights, thtfacultis, the powers of the other member States, namely of the other parties to the Charter.
The elements collected in the preceding pages seem to indicate that although the UN is without doubt an organization, having its legal statute in the Charter (and in that sense a constitution of its own), the Charter is not 'the constitution' or 'a constitution' of the community of the member States or of the community of all existing states, let 29 Arangio-Ruiz, Rapporti contrattuali, supra note 7, at 130 et seq.; Idem, The Normative Rote', supra note 13, at 675 et sea. and Idem, The UN Declaration, supra note 13,m245 etseq.
Of course, tins has nothing to do with -and does Dot exclude -the legal personality of the Organization in its own internal system and in the legal system of any member State (Article 104), notably in the legal system of Etats de siege.
alone the community of mankind. In other words, the UN is not an organization of the member States themselves, almost as if they were in some measure absorbed or dissolved in it; nor is it, despite the bold lie with which the text of the UN Charter begins -'We the Peoples' -an organization of the peoples of the member States, as a single people. The member States remain, under the Charter, the separate, independent political entities they were beforehand, in their mutual relations as well as in relation to the UN; and they remain also -this is of paramount importance -subject to general international law and endowed with the rights deriving therefrom. Indeed, they would have remained sovereign political entities, given the way that the Organization was set up, even if the Charter did not state so, or stated so less clearly than it actually does. 31 The peoples, for their part, remain under the predominant control of the member States, despite the ever-growing number of obligations to which states are subject, under customary or treaty law -including UN-sponsored international instruments -regarding the treatment of their subjects.
Rather than organizing the member States or their peoples, the UN organizes a portion of the relations and cooperation among the member States. Like other international bodies, the UN carries out international activities in a narrow sense on the basis of the Charter, as well as operational activities on the basis of instruments substantially supplementing the Charter.
In the first capacity, UN organs function, vis-d-vis states, as another kind of instrument, in addition to ordinary diplomatic organs, of essentially unaltered egalitarian relations among the states themselves. In envisaging the accomplishment by UN organs of what we call international activity in a narrow sense -namely addressing decisions or recommendations to member governments for the purposes and the effects indicated in the Charter -states have organized their relations in a different way, while remaining merely juxtaposed as before.
In the second capacity, the UN operates (as well as the so-called supra-national institutions) vis-d-vis the subjects of states, or vis-d-vis the subordinate organs of states (and even vis-d-vis the states themselves as legal persons of municipal law) as organs of the states involved, so empowered to function by virtue of the national legal systems of those states as adapted to the relevant international agreements. By occasionally using UN organs for such operational activities, states deal in a different manner with some of their internal and/or external affairs; such affairs remain, however, under their ultimate political and legal control, except in the measure in which the relevant ad hoc arrangements envisage a vicarious UN role.
Once the false notions of the community and of its functional personification are set aside, it may clearly be seen that in setting up the UN the founding states organized neither the universal society of men and women (or the regional society of their peoples) nor the so-called 'society of states'. However important, what they did was something less than any of the above.
It thus seems reasonable to believe that the UN system has brought about, on the one hand, a huge legal phenomenon of a contractual, inorganic, 'private' law nature: the rules of the inter-state compact and the egalitarian right/duty relations arising therefrom among the member states. This is a monumental phenomenon because of the dimensions of the entities involved and the interests at stake, but not for its normative quality or 'weight'. It is still the relationnel of Holland's 'private law writ large'. On the other hand, there is a tiny phenomenon -microscopically small by comparison with that just mentioned and with the phenomenon that under certain conditions one would wish to see -of a public law, institutional nature: the inter-individual law of the UN apparatus.
The theoreticians of the Charter as a constitution and of the federal analogy do not seem to perceive the difference and the vast hiatus existing between the two phenomena. They interpret the first phenomenon in a public law light on the basis of the second, constructing in this way a single imaginary edifice in which the colossal proportions of the 'private' law relations among sovereign states and the public law nature of the apparatus' internal relations are, so to speak, summed or multiplied together. A hybrid, confusing theoretical construction, the result of which is the notion that the UN Charter is die constitution of an international society ambiguously understood as a legal community of the member States or their peoples, of all states, or of mankind -it is not clear which.
VI. Some Immeasurable Differences
Turning specifically to the federal analogy, the differences between a federal state and the UN -very few of which seem to be fully appreciated by the prevailing doctrine -are so immense that to perceive them fully, let alone illustrate them, is almost as difficult as grasping astronomical distances.
In describing the UN, the difference deriving from the fact that it has no direct power over the peoples of the member States is commonly pointed out Direct power over individuals is indeed one of the most important features of federal states compared with confederations. Direct power over the nation is precisely the element which facilitates a federal government in expanding its powers at the expense of its member states because it can directly address the nation's needs and expectations. It is this obvious gap which is stressed when we all lament that UN organs are not endowed with the powers of the so-called supra-national organs. It is this same gap that was denounced by Hamilton and the other federalists as they sought to persuade their countrymen of the necessity to move to a true constitution.
But it is not only on account of this immense, and in a sense unidirectional, gap, that the federal analogy does not hold water, although that gap, too, is of considerable relevance. Of far greater importance is the fact that the peoples themselves took no part in the foundation of the UN; nor do they have, subject as they are to their respective states, any direct voice in the procedure or the merits of an extension of the powers of UN organs. As emanations of states, and not of peoples, UN organs are subject only to the control of state governments. No similar mechanism may be found in the UN system, for instance, to the control that the people of the United States, the real constituency of the legal order of the Americaii nation, exercises in so many ways over the condua of the central organs, including any actions which may amount to an extension of powers of the President or Congress. The guarantees provided by such controls to the American nation are hardly conceivable in an inter-state system like the United Nations. The peoples have no decisive say in the matter of respect for the 'purposes and principles' of the Charter on the part of UN organs.
But that is not all.
There are indeed, if possible, even more astronomical differences between a federal constitution and the UN Charter, in one crucial sense -in particular, in relation to the Security Council.
Within the framework of a national constitution, political majorities normally become minorities, and vice versa, over time spans usually lasting not more than a few years. State powers under the constitution are exercised over time by different parties, factions and individuals. Even in a dictatorship, change will inevitably occur because the dictator, a mortal being, is obviously subject to a *time span'. Any extension of powers of a federal state's central organs -by effect of the doctrine of implied powers -will profit whichever party, faction or person rules in the future.
Very little of this is conceivable within the society of states; a point which appears, however, not to enjoy the consideration it deserves by scholars and governments, including, quite surprisingly, many of those UN member governments which are not among the states classed as 'strong'. It is states, not individuals or groups, which compete for power positions in the international society. At first sight, one may suppose that there is no difference here to national societies. But within the inter-state system the differences in size and weight among the fifty, hundred or two hundred co-existing state units -which translate into factual differences in power -are tendentially permanent Significant changes in the relative weights of states normally require periods of time measurable not in years, or even in decades, but in centuries.
It follows that any distribution of normative, judicial or executive powers agreed upon by the founders of an international union presents a degree of permanence utterly incompatible with any notion of alternation in the exercise of the assigned powers. This is clearly the main reason for the limitations placed on the powers of the restricted or-gans of inter-state unions; it is the reason for the reservation of sovereign equality; it is also the reason for the reservation of domestic jurisdiction. And it is for this same reason that no state -other than the strong -should readily accept the application of the implied powers doctrine in the restricted and most authoritative organ, where the strong are represented in conditions of privilege. Thus, while it is understandable that greater responsibilities were entrusted to certain states at the time of establishment of a body such as the UN, particularly in consideration of actual and specific security exigencies, it is not equally understandable, if at all, that the privileged members could feel entitled to seek, and the non-privileged members should be obliged to accept, extensions of powers which the latter have no possibility of ever exercising. The more so in the absence of adequate opportunities for alternation and effective controls by a judicial organ or a more representative political body.
It does not seem that the constitutional conceptions of die Charter can find valid argument in the position of hegemony held by certain states -the strong -within and outside the walls of the UN. The presence of the strong within the UN apparatus -taken together with the particular tasks entrusted to the Council and the binding effect of that organ's decisions, especially the possibility of recourse to armed force -is viewed by a considerable part of the doctrine as a decisive element in support of the thesis that the Charter is an instrument of a constitutional nature. I believe, rather, that it argues the contrary.
(i) Hegemony is not, so to speak, an 'institute' of international law. On a par with war, which is, or was, tolerated but not legitimized as a means of changing legal rules or situations, hegemony is not legitimized by general international law, except in the minds of those who identify law with might or who consider law to be a direct product thereof. 32 In fact, hegemony would appear to be even less palatable to international law, which has as one of its fundamental -and probably constitutional -norms the principle 32 An example from the many can perhaps be teen in the book by B. Stan, Les aspects juridUpies de la guerre du Gdfe (1991) 488 et seq^ esp. 490 et seq.
of the sovereign equality of states. It is difficult to concede, therefore, that the exercise of hegemony by one or more states introduces an element of legal verticalization into international law. Broadly speaking, die relations between ihtfiirhende state(s) and the gefUhrte states) 33 do not approach the level of a legally institutionalized supremacy. Eluding legal definition and failing to alter the legal equality principle, they remain on the political plane.
The egalitarian nature of UK system is not altered, according to the prevailing doctrine, even by hegemonic situations formalized by an unequal alliance or protectorate treaty. Far from being viewed as a legal sanction of constitutional supremacy of the strong ally or protector, situations created by such treaties are generally envisaged as merely contractual limitations of the liberty of the protected or otherwise weaker state or states. Of course, an unequal alliance or protectorate treaty may well prove to be a step towards a constitutional integration of the states involved. Should some such process » i however, it would automatically transcend the plane of international legal y p g relations to enter the plane of public law relations within the framework of the larger community resulting from the more or less unequal fusion of the peoples and structures of the interested states. It is by no means guesswork, therefore, to hold that international legal relations remain, in the final analysis, essentially egalitarian.
(ii) The hegemony exercised by given states -singly or in concert -on a merely historical and political plane should not be confused with the special position awarded such states by the Charter within an apparatus such as that of the UN. One frequently reads that the basis of the constitutional characterization of the UN is to be found in the pre-eminent nature of the 'directorate' of the five, four, three, two, or even only one major power. One also reads that international organizations like the League and die UN find their institutional precedents in the Concert of Europe and in the international conferences in which mat Concert manifested itself.
Such a notion is misleading. It generates die impression that the hegemony and the treaty establishing an international organization somehow reinforce each otiier, in the sense that the directorate of the strong states lends to the organization an institutional authority which a mere pact between states would not be in a position to bestow, while the inter-state compact -the Charter in our case -confers a juridical legitimation upon the supremacy of the directorate which general international law denies.
The fact that given states provide greater input than others in the adoption of a UN resolution does not alter the legal nature of die resolution in relation to its addressees: the resolution remains what it is according to die Charter, namely a complement of right/duty relationships created by die Charter as a treaty.
If die strong states succeed in obliging a recalcitrant member to comply with a resolution that they themselves have an interest in seeing implemented, the resolution itself does not by virtue of this acquire a higher degree of legal authority than it possesses by virtue of die Charter. The legal force of die resolution rests merely upon die treaty, any 33 UniWe to find tn English equivalent I use H. Triepd'i terms: tee Die Htgemonie: tin Buck von GefOhnen Staaten (1938) .
authoritative actions on the part of tbe strong remain outside the Charter system. Such actions simply qualify, under given conditions, as part of a general international law which still exists, as lawful countermeasures -by the strong, no more than by other states -aimed at securing compliance with treaty obligations.
VII. Some Concluding Thoughts
By way of conclusion, it may be useful to explain, in practical terms, the argument I have tried to develop in this article.
Salient episodes in the process of revitalization of the Security Council's role following the end of the Cold War include, in the order in which some of them spring to mind: the Gulf crisis, the Lockerbie affair, the Yugoslav crisis, the civil war in Somalia, the Haitian crisis and Rwanda. In not a single one of these cases has the problem of the delimitation of powers of the Security Council or of the UN as a whole failed to be raised; and I am not alone in believing that the Security Council has operated ultra vires in more than one instance or phase. Nevertheless, the work of the commentators, which should serve, together with the vigilance of states, to verify the conformity of UN action with the Charter and with general international law, has left, in this writer's opinion, a great deal to be desired. And this, I believe, is especially due to the prevalence in international legal literature of the distorted, though allegedly progressive, conception of the Charter as discussed in this article.
The principal consequence of this situation is that the strong states are encouraged to pursue choices and actions which are legally (and sometimes politically or morally) questionable. At the same time, the only subjects who have a voice in such matters and might resist -namely the governments of the other states -are discouraged rather than spurred on in the direction of opposition. scholars who remain reluctant to express criticism do not succumb too easily to the temptation to which I alluded at the outset -that is, the temptation to develop the subtlest arguments in order to justify any action or inaction of the UN. In my view, this is especially true, as far as the Security Council is concerned, of Western scholars, who seem to be more willing to recognize implied powers of the Security Council than they are for other UN organs. Unfortunately, this proposal provoked a clash with some members of the Commission -particularly with one -according to whom it was not necessary to disturb either the ICJ or the General Assembly. Their argument centred on the idea that, since most crimes -and not just aggression -constitute a threat to the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter, there was no need for a convention on state responsibility to include provisions in the matter of state crimes. The competence of the Security Council would be quite sufficient for both the determination of existence/attribution of a crime to a state as well as decisions on the consequences in terms of Chapter VII measures. In response to the objection that the Council's task is limited to maintaining the peace and does not extend to acting as judge, the above unmentioned colleague argued, in substance, that the subject was covered by the Council's implied powers, which he recognized as extending to both the judicial and the legislative function. Not only did the argument that the Charter is not, or is not quite, a constitution go completely unheeded, but so too did the point that it would be more logical (while ensuring that the last word would remain with the Hague Court) to vest the General Assembly, or at least also the General Assembly, with the competence to make the preliminary determination offitmus of existence/attribution for crimes other than aggression, namely the crimes against self-determination, against human rights or the environment I need hardly add that my unmentioned colleague managed to prevail almost entirely, thanks not only to the absence of various members and to what rightly or wrongly seemed to me a certain inertia on the part of others, but also thanks to the argument that my proposals would require modifications to the Charter a point with regard to which I had not been able to persuade the Commission to hold a discussion worthy of the importance of the issue. 37 The matter of crimes has remained, it is It should be added, before closing, that the concerns that have prompted this piece of writing are not confined to the doctrine of implied powers and the dangers of its abuse; dangers for which too many of my colleagues do not seem to perceive the necessity to find some remedy.
As far as international legal scholars are concerned, I find two tendencies dangerous -and both are also present within the Italian School of international law. The first is the tendency to justify in law anything that happens in the UN by assuming too easily either the modification or abrogation of Charter rules by tacit agreement or through the formation of customary rules; rules which, if need be, would change when the UN practice changes direction. I would feel more confident about the future of the UN if, every so often, one were to find that there had been no modification of the law, that the article of the Charter had not disappeared, but that it had suffered, purely and simply, a breach; and likewise, that no customary rule had come into being or vanished.
The second tendency finds expression in a recently published book, 39 which expounds, in more than one of its chapters, a thesis which in a certain manner addsalongside the problems I fear may derive from the doctrine of implied powers -the possibly greater problems which could arise from combining the privileged condition of certain states in the Security Council with the condition of strength they would also enjoy legally, according to opinions expressed in the book, under general of those provisions on international «?**» crimes which raised the ipt* vk*n of the delimitation of the powers of the Security Council I could no longer make use, then, of the continuity of the position of Special Rapporteur, a fact which in the previous session had enabled me to obtain from the plenum, albeit with difficulty, the handing down of the proposed articles to the Drafting Committee Other factor! also worked in favour of positions of the kind held by the above-mentioned colleague prevailing in the project: the absence from the session of numerous members of die TJLC; the general fatigue (frequent in die last year of die five-year mandate); and the imminence-of the elections for the successive quinquennium. I could not avoid the impression that in the TLC, as in die whole of the UN, certain 'strong' influences make themselves felt more dian is desirable. 38 The implied subjection of the law of state responsibility to die possible incursions of a restricted political body which has no compelrace in the area of state responsibility was aggravated by die fact that the D_JC state responsibility project also included a general provision under which die 'legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a State set out [in Part Two of the project]' are subject, as appropiate, to the provisions and procedures of die Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. I refer to Article 39 of the project as adopted by the ILC in July 1996: a provision originally ptopused by a previous Special Rapporteur (at a time prior to die revJTilTTifkm of the Security Council's role which came about after the end of me Cold War) and strongly opposed by the present writer over a number of years. 39 P.Pkx)^itd.X ItuenrmideUeNazici^ Unite edirim>imernaaijnale (\995).
international law itself. These states would apparently operate, 'uti universi', both on behalf of the international community as a whole, and on behalf of the UN. The fabric of international law -that law which our law professors described to us as being essentially horizontal and inorganic -would thus attain a considerable degree of what some of the authors of the book call the 'verticalization' of international law inside and outside the UN. This idea frightens me even more than the constitutional theories of the Charter and the federal analogy. In the first place, the process is extended from the Charter to general international law, where one loses even the minimal anchorage that the other doctrinal tendency preserves, albeit formally, in the written document. In the second place, while the constitutional theories have at least the merit of drawing inspiration (albeit in words) from a model of inter-individual social organization, capable in theory of developing towards more acceptable forms of coexistence, the assumed 'verticalization' tends, if I understand it correctly, to present the whole structure of international law, including the UN Charter, as a monstrous pyramid of states placed at different levels, one above the other, according to the relative degree of strength of each unit This amounts to a translation of hegemony into legally sanctioned hegemony.
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Positions such as these cannot fail to influence to some degree the lay world: -and here I am thinking particularly of governments and the media. As regards the former, it must be borne in mind that control of the legality of action of the UN can only come from governments -and from the governments of states other than the strong ones. In UN circles, in New York as in Geneva, it is increasingly assumed that nothing can be done at the UN without the consent of certain states.
One wonders what encouragement to resist abuse can ever come, to the governments of the small or weak states, from theories according to which the strong would have acquired the legal powers of a world directorate without being subject to all the obligations of common members, and without submitting to any duty to account for their actions to the states in relation to which they would exercise, through the Council, allegedly legislative and adjudicatory functions not contemplated in any provision of the Charter.
Less fanciful and more realistic legal constructions would also contribute to improved information for the public. Too often the general public receives uncritical presentations of the restricted organ of the UN as a 'directorate', as the most powerful 'organ of the new international order' or as the 'embryo of world government'. People of goodwill rightly place their hopes in the United Nations. But much remains to be done, in a rigorously critical sense, if one does not wish those hopes to be disappointed.
In the matter of state crimes, for example, this theory would totally endorse the, in my opinion, retrograde solution adopted by the ILC in the project'i ankles, referred to above and in notes 37 and 38 supra.
This writer is well aware that the constitutional theory (with the consequent federal analogy) has found support not only among a number of governments, but also in not insignificant, although mostly advisory, dicta of the ICJ. At the same time, the governments which might have been expected to put up some resistance to the most striking of recent instances of trespassing by the Security Council have seemed to be inclined, instead, to acquiesce.
The few relevant pronouncements made by the ICJ -a highly respectable body which international legal scholars should not, however, feel obliged to consider any less fallible than the Pope -do not seem to involve issues of a dimension comparable to the crucial general issue which is at stake when discussing the merits of the federal analogy and the applicability of the implied powers doctrine to the UN. This latter issue is nothing less than the question whether the 'being' or 'organism' created at San Francisco in fact possesses the genes or the DNA of the world government to be. Be that as it may, there are also signs of reaction on the part of dissenting judges, some scholars and a few governments -signs which should give cause for serious meditation among the adherents to the federal analogy thesis and which give this author cause for encouragement to further pursue his investigation.
As regards governments, it is possible that the passivity displayed by many of those governments which would have reason to resist the misuse of the implied powers doctrine may be traceable to ephemeral causes. One cause could be an inadequate perception of the present and future implications of the doctrine for the preservation and promotion of the rule of law in the inter-state system. Another reason might be what I would call the 'parliamentary analogy syndrome': that is, the illusion which persons acting as delegates or experts in a UN body may readily develop that they are involved in the work of one or the other of the branches of a real world parliament: a syndrome that may well lead to acquiescing, for the sake of supposedly progressive steps towards world government, to abusive interpretations of the Charter. Both of these factors would surely be reduced if scholars were more willing to voice adequate criticism whenever necessary.
41
Be that also as it may, even if one were to admit, on further reflection, that a certain federal analogy may be justified in the Charter, the considerations developed in the preceding pages should serve at least to prompt some moderation. Surely, it is one thing to use the doctrine of implied powers for a broad interpretation of powers actually attributed to an organ by the Charter within the overall function that that organ is called on to perform; it is another thing to use that same doctrine to justify the exercise by an organ of a function which is not envisaged, either for the UN as a whole or for that organ in particular. A more accurate study of American constitu- 41 An additional factor may also be the belief among some young Third World participants in UN bodies -pointed out to me as a curiosity by that keen observer of international legal and political affairs, who was Roberto Ago -that any international law in existence since 1946 is the law of the UN Charter, a naive (although somewhat understandable) belief which may Ietd the lawyer delegate to put all his eggs into die more easily manrpulable 'UN law' basket, while neglecting the support offered -to new states as well as the old -by a hopefully well alive general international law.
Gaetano Arargio-Ruiz tional practice, which I have not as yet been able to undertake, could most likely throw more light on the difference. A distinction also needs to be made between one political organ and the other, and between the kinds of action to be deployed. It is one thing to overtly apply the doctrine to an organ representing on a general and equal basis the entire UN membership (where all concerned can see and judge); it is another thing for it to be applied by and within a body whose membership is of restricted composition and which displays unequal voting rights. Again, it is one thing to broaden the scope of a recommendatory function; it is another to broaden the scope of decision-making. The current trend quite clearly appears to present a danger of undermining the statutory structure of an organization which, according to widespread opinion, was conceived as & forum for discussion and cooperation among equal states -including the implementation of what I consider to be the unequal alliance element of Chapter VII -and not as the embryo of a super-state.
The crucial point is that it is very hard to conceive as a normal development of the 'organism' created by the Charter the fact that the Security Council turn itself proprio motu, and without adequate control by the entire membership, from the gendarme that the founders are generally considered to have created, into the supreme legislative, judicial and executive organ of a super-state. It seems reasonable to assume that, had the founders envisaged the possibility of such a dramatic development, they would have provided for adequate guarantees. If any governments are really inclined to transform the UN into a super-state, they should call upon the whole membership to participate in a properly prepared constitutional reform, however difficult that would surely be. But what no government should seek to do is to use the UN as an instrument of its own foreign policy. To do so could seriously undermine the future of the 'organism' created at San Francisco, whatever its true nature may be.
